Since the dawn of modern microbiology in the late 19th century, the scientific community has been fascinated by disease and challenged to understand, prevent, and cure the myriad afflictions caused by what we now categorize as viruses, bacteria, fungi, and parasites. Some of these diseases cause high mortality, and their causative agents are readily transmitted by aerosols, especially in the laboratory. In their naturally-occurring context, the most dangerous of these pathogens are mostly, if not entirely, viruses that are exotic to the United States. Thus, over the years the scientific community, particularly microbiologists and biosafety professionals, have developed sophisticated engineering controls, laboratory practices, and procedures to ensure that the risks associated with storing, handling, and conducting research on these organisms are reduced to the minimum possible. The result is what we now call maximum containment, or biosafety level/containment level (BSL/ CL)-4 laboratories. First and foremost, these laboratories are designed and operated to protect those working in the laboratory, and those in the external surrounding environment, from the pathogens being handled within the laboratory. These are the pathogens that pose a high risk of life-threatening disease and for which no prophylactic measures or treatments are available.
The number of maximum containment laboratories in the United States and Western countries has slowly increased over the past several decades. The research capabilities built into these laboratories have become increasingly sophisticated, to include medical imaging and animal telemetry, just to name two. At the same time, new viruses have emerged that appear to pose sufficient risk so as to require handling in these maximum containment laboratories. In parallel with these developments, the tools of molecular biology, molecular genetics, as well as genomics and all the related "omics," provide opportunities to explore and understand human and animal pathogens in ways that were never possible before. Maximum containment laboratories are essential to the conduct of this research on the properties and behaviors of these pathogens and, more importantly, are critical to the development of strategies and products to detect, prevent, and treat the very serious diseases caused by them. These laboratories provide the critical infrastructure necessary to support scientific advances important to improving public health both at home and abroad.
However, this progress comes with a price tag. Maximum containment laboratories are expensive to construct, operate, and maintain. The strict requirements to contain and decontaminate all waste streams necessitate much more complex engineering than is found in lower containment level laboratories. What's more, the maintenance and operational staff also require special training and experience to safely and efficiently operate these facilities, which are becoming increasingly more automated and sophisticated. The researchers and staff who work in maximum containment laboratories likewise require high levels of training and experience to work safely and effectively with dangerous pathogens.
In a fiscally constrained environment, operators of all laboratories face challenges to minimize their costs of operation. Designers and operators of maximum containment laboratories are trying to adopt and adapt ways to reduce costs for energy, maintenance, and operations. All of this must be accomplished without any compromise to the safe operation of these laboratories.
Adding to these practical, operational demands are additional elements of oversight and regulation stimulated by events over the past decade. Today, significant focus is not only on biosafety-ensuring that hazardous organisms can be studied safely without impacting the surrounding populace and environment-but also on biosecurity and personnel reliability. Operators and managers of maximum containment laboratories are increasingly asked to implement biosecurity measures to assure strict and redundant control of access to the laboratories and the pathogens themselves to prevent their loss, theft, or misuse. They are also asked to provide "personnel reliability"-assurances that the individuals who do have access are trustworthy and reliable. These requirements come with their own price tag-real time costs in terms of labor hours and opportunity costs for the time dedicated to compliance management versus research. Another potential opportunity cost that is far more difficult to quantify is the decision on the part of a scientist or technical staff person whether or not to undertake work in a maximum containment, highly regulated environment. This potential cost remains of great concern to those considering the future scientific activities that require the use of maximum containment laboratories. The U.S. Government has developed a new web site entitled "S3: Science, Safety, and Security" to address biosafety, biosecurity, biocontainment, and biorisk management. The web address is: www.phe.gov/S3. The goal of the web site is to promote transparency and broader awareness about the evolving nature of biological agents that can be hazardous, and how to handle and use these agents safely and securely. The resources provided on the website include information for laboratory personnel who work with potentially hazardous biological agents, their supervisors, the management personnel of the institutions in which they work, policymakers, and the public. The S3 web site will be updated and expanded to include more U.S. Government resources and information. At this time, the resources are divided into sections on:
• biosecurity, biosafety, biocontainment, and biorisk management • frequently asked questions • import-export of biological materials • legal and policy framework • strategies and reports • presentations from select agent programs, and • additional US government resources.
The U.S. Government is developing collaborative relationships with the life science community and other stakeholders to raise awareness about efforts to promote progress in the life sciences while preventing and deterring its misuse. This S3 web site will allow the U.S. Government to share policies and best practices relating to biological risk management. The U.S. Government is committed to working with life scientists to identify mechanisms to improve biological risk management without causing unintended negative consequences for progress in research.
